Scythe : Proceedings and Bulletin of the International Data Farming Community, Issue 11 Workshop 23 by Meyer, Ted & Horne, Gary
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
SEED (Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs) Center Scythe : Proceedings and Bulletin of the International Data Farming Community
2012-03
Scythe : Proceedings and Bulletin of the
International Data Farming Community,









Issue 11 - Workshop 23
Scythe - Proceedings and Bulletin of the International Data Farming Community
Issue 11 - Workshop 23
Proceedings and Bulletin of the 





 MSG-088 Data Farming Case Study on 
	





 Future Indirect Fire Cost Effectiveness	
 7
Team 3:	
 Data Farming and the Exploration of 
	
 Interagency, Interdisciplinary, and 
..............	





 MSG-088 "Data Farming In Support of
....	
  NATO" Case Study "Force Protection”	
 18
Team 5:	
 Risk Assessment for Readiness and 
	
 Life Cycle Cost for 
..................................	
 Major Weapon Systems	
 22
Team 6:	
 Using Social Network Analysis to 
.....................	
 Enhance Data Farming Analysis	
 26
Focus Group:  Data Farming in Support of 
......................	
 Strategic Operational Analysis	
 29
Scythe
Proceedings and Bulletin of the 
International Data Farming 
Community
It is appropriate that the publication 
supporting the International Data Farming 
Workshop is named after a farming 
implement. In farming, a scythe is used to 
clear and harvest. We hope that the 
“Scythe” will perform a similar role for 
our data farming community by being a 
tool to help prepare for our data farming 
efforts and harvest the results. The Scythe 
is provided to all attendees of the 
Workshops. Electronic copies of back 
issues may be obtained from 
www.projectalbert.org. Please contact the 
editors for additional paper copies.
The Scythe consists primarily of team 
reports written by the team members on 
activity, analysis, and results in their team 
during the workshop from their 
perspective. Please let us know what you 
think of this eleventh prototypical issue. 
Articles, ideas for articles and material, 








"Making Modeling and Simulation 
Effective for NATO Decision-Makers"
International Data Farming Community
Overview
The International Data Farming Community is a 
consortium of researchers interested in the study of Data 
Farming, its methodologies, applications, tools, and 
evolution.
The primary venue for the Community is the biannual 
International Data Farming Workshops, where 
researchers participate in team-oriented model 
development, experimental design, and analysis using 
high performance computing resources... that is, Data 
Farming. 
Scythe, Proceedings and Bulletin of the 
International Data Farming Community, Issue 11, 
Workshop 23 Publication date: March 2012  
Bulletin Editors
........................Gary Horne:! datafarming@verizon.net
...................................Ted Meyer: ! tedmeyer@mac.com
IDFW 23:
“TRANSFORMATION”
by Gary Horne 
International Data Farming Workshop Number 23 was held in Riihimäki, Finland in conjunction with 
the fifth meeting of the NATO Modeling and Simulation Group 088, “Data Farming in Support of 
NATO” from September 18th through 23rd, 2011. This workshop was the first we have held in Finland 
and it was a great venue for the data farming community! We had six teams and our goal during the 
week was, as usual, to work in these teams using data farming methods to explore our important 
questions.
On behalf of our host, Dr. Bernt Åkesson from the Finnish Defense Forces, I would like to express our 
thanks to the team leaders, the plenary speakers, and all of the participants in IDFW 23! And, of course, a 
large Thank You to Bernt and all of the folks from Finland who worked so hard to make IDFW 23 a 
world-class event!
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International Data Farming Workshop 23
September 2011 — Riihimäki, Finland
This issue, our eleventh, of The Scythe contains a summary of each work team effort. And looking 
ahead, our Data Farming community will be in Monterey, California, USA, from the 25th through the 30th 
of March 2012 for our next workshop, International Data Farming Workshop 24 which will be held in 
conjunction with MSG-088 Meeting 7. And for those of you who like to plan a little more in advance, 
International Data Farming Workshop 25 to be held in conjunction with MSG-088 Meeting 9 will be held 
in Istanbul from the 16th through the 21st of September 2012. We hope to see you at both!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! Gary Horne
! ! ! ! ! ! ! Chair, NATO MSG-088
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Team 1: MSG-088 Data Farming Case Study on 
Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief
Team 1 Members
Bernt Åkesson, Finland 
Gary Horne, USA
Katri Mässeli, Finland 
Fiona Narayanan, USA






The objective of the NATO Modeling and Simulation Task 
Group "Data Farming in Support of NATO" (MSG-088) is to 
assess the data farming capabilities that NATO, PfP, and 
Contact Countries, schools, and agencies have that could 
contribute to the development of improved decision support 
to NATO forces. As part of the Program of Work of MSG-088, 
scenarios in context areas where data farming methods 
could be used will be examined as proof-of-concept efforts to 
illustrate the veracity of data farming in this decision 
support. In order to realize the MSG-088 objective to conduct 
proof-of-concept explorations that demonstrate the benefits 
of data farming for decision support, the task group has 
planned two case studies.
As part of IDFW 23/ MSG-088 Meeting 5 work, Team 1 
pursued the development of the case study on humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). The team focused on 
medical logistics and casualty evacuation questions for an 
earthquake scenario.
A draft scenario was established prior to the workshop 
and the Sandis Model was selected to be used in the 
exploration of questions to include:
• How do the logistical networks, evacuation chains, and 
distribution of materials affect the loss of life?
• Where can the response be improved and where are the 
bottlenecks?
• What are the probability distributions for different triage 
classes over time under various conditions?
• What are the effects of changes in coordination, capacity, 
and resource distribution on triage classes/loss of life?
• What if T-craft is available? Are there changes needed 
regarding evacuation/treatment decisions? What are the 
implications regarding this greater capacity on 
coordination and kinds of resources available?
THE SCENARIO
We developed a scenario based a fictional place with 10,000 
residents.  We named it Ganglion and located it in a coastal 
region with a capital city named Somata and two outlying 
populated areas. An earthquake and resulting tsunami has 
ravaged the coast of Ganglion. A significant number of 
casualties have occurred and the indigenous government, 
which has also been significantly affected by the earthquake 
and tsunami, has reduced capacity to properly handle all the 
casualties. A NATO Task Force has been formed to assist 
Ganglion, at the request of the government of Ganglion, with 
the main mission of providing for casualty evacuation and 
resulting care. Given that some indigenous hospitals are still 
operating, a NATO Task Force will provide care and 
evacuation for more serious injuries, while the hospitals and 
local trauma centers will act as triage center. The NATO Task 
Force will primarily operate in sea-based mode so as not to 
overly tax the existing, damaged infrastructure.
TRIAGE CLASS 1 CLASS 2 CLASS 3
Collection points (x3) 10 15 20
Ship 1 90 210 300
Ship 2 10 25 35
Hospital 50 100 200
Transport – Ship 1 5 10 15
Transport – Ship 2 10 15 15
Ambulance Capacity 2 0 0
Car Capacity 0 2 4
Table 1: Assets for responding to the disaster 
and their baseline capacity
Internal communications, such as cell-phone services and 
internet connections, were effectively disabled.  Also, the 
seaport and associated infrastructure has been damaged, as 
well as the international airport at Somata.  Figure 1 depicts 
the scenario and Table 1 shows the assets for responding to 
the disaster and their baseline capacity.
SANDIS
The scenario was instantiated in the Sandis model and the 
following results were obtained through data farming. 
Sandis is a software tool for operational analysis, which has 
been developed by the Finnish Defence Forces Research 
Centre.
Sandis calculates battle losses and it is possible to 
pinpoint the time and place where they occur. Therefore it is 
also well suited as a tool for analyzing medical treatment and 
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evacuation of casualties from the battlefield. The medical 
model in Sandis was originally developed with two goals in 
mind: firstly, to create simple methods for studying the 
relationship between combat ability and effectiveness of 
medical treatment and secondly, to evaluate the evacuation of 
wounded from platoon level through company, battalion and 
brigade levels to the evacuation hospital.
RESULTS
The initial variables we farmed over included the capacity of 
hospitals, capacity of transport to ships, speed of vehicles on 
roads, and arrival times of the ships.  Using JMP, we looked 
at the MoE’s for the number of dead and the number treated. 
Figure 2  shows the probability distribution for both 
measures of effectiveness.  Figure 3 is our partition tree – 
which shows us which variables will have the biggest 
impact.  From this partition tree, you can see that the 
capacity of the hospital affected the number treated & 
number dead.  
The second evening, our iterations were changed so that 
the collection point capacities were now varied from 25 to 
200% (instead of 100%), and we modified ship 2  to have more 
capacity as well.  From our previous iterations, we found that 
ship 2 was too small to treat/help patients effectively. 
Varying the capacity from 100 – 2000% enabled us to look at a 
bigger class of ship and understand how that may or may not 
help.  We also added a method for patients to deteriorate 
during transit to the hospital, ship or collection point to give 
us more realism.  
Expanding the capacity of the collection points and ship 
2 as well  as the deterioration of the patients while in transit 
changed the distribution of the MOES, but didn’t affect the 
order of the importance of the variables as shown in figure 4.
In iterations 3 and 4 we wanted to try to understand what 
might happen if the length of the scenario was extended. In 
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Figure 1: Ganglion Scenario
Figure 2. Probability distributions for the number of dead and 
the number treated
iteration 4 we also took out the center collection point. At this 
point we realized that extending the time of the scenario was 
not informative to our questions, because there was no change 
after 24 hours.  We did learn that we needed to be cognizant of 
the point where a steady state is reached.
Figure 3. Partition tree for initial runs
Figure 4. Partition tree for second set of runs
In our fifth iteration we applied what we learned from 
iterations 3/4 and returned to examining a 24  hour time 
period and used all three collection points.  What we changed 
was the number of one of the ground transit assets 
(ambulances) and expanded the range of the ground speed.
Figure 5 is a comparison of the MOEs from the results for 
iteration 5.  The results track to intuition as you can see from 
the correspondence of low number of dead to the highlighting 
in JMP of high number of treated (on the top in Figure 5a). 
And conversely highlighting the high number of dead 
corresponds to (mostly) lower number of treated (on the 
bottom in Figure 5b).
Figure 5a. Highlighting high number of treated
Figure 5b. Highlighting high number of dead
Also in the fifth iteration, the most important explanatory 
variables for reducing the number of dead were increased 
road speed, earlier  arrival of ship 1, and larger capacity of the 
hospital.  These results are shown in figure 6.
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Figure 6. Final results on explanatory variables 
for reducing the number of dead
LOG BATTLE COMMAND
We also used the model Log Battle Command (LBC) during 
IDFW 23. The objective for using LBC was to develop a 
scenario that could be used to corroborate the results 
obtained using the Sandis model.  While this was not 
achieved during the week, a basic framework was 
established for future modeling efforts. Additionally, the 
following functional enhancements were added to LBC:
• Explicit representation of casualties.
• Transition of casualties between triage classes.
• Medical evacuation using aerial and ship-to-shore 
vehicles.
And we concluded that LBC should be useful for future 
data farming efforts in support of this NATO case study.
SUMMARY
At the end of the week we arrived at the following 
conclusions and recommendations.
• The bottlenecks depend on the initial capacity, initial 
demand, arrival times, and speed.
• The arrival time of ships offshore make a  difference. 
Speed and capacity go hand in hand to save lives.
• We need to obtain data on triage class distribution across 
various conditions.
• More logic is required in the model for asset allocation 
and routing.
• More work on ship-surface asset contribution is needed.
• More work on extending the scenario length is needed.
And in summary, we had an enjoyable week of data farming 
and enjoying the beauty of Finland.
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Team 2: Future Indirect Fire Cost Effectiveness
TEAM 2 MEMBERS
Lappi Esa, Heininen, Tapio, 
PVTT, Finland
Yüksel Ergün İnci 
ASELSAN, Turkey
Hörling Pontus, Hinshaw Frida
FOI, Sweden
Lappi Teo, Ots Karl
University of Tampere, Finland
INTRODUCTION
We studied the use of a  methodology for indirect fire 
effectiveness of present and future weapons. System cost 
was studied in a spreadsheet by combining the total lifetime 
costs of the shooting platform, ammunition used, and 
targeting and fire control. We collected a list of important 
parameters, which should be considered in this kind of 
studies.
However, because of time limitations during the workshop, 
we focused only one simple scenario. Indirect fire was 
studied in only one scenario in only one case, with one 
system at the time, without connection to a larger scenario 
and without accurate data for cost calculations.
The simulation was done using Sandis software [1]. The 
goal was to find out what would be the cost for each system 
to provide 30% losses with at least 0.8 probabilities within 
the selected scenario.
Critical Parameters for artillery cost 
effectiveness
The parameters are discussed under two groups as war 
gaming parameters, that affect the performance measure of 
the weapon systems and life cycle cost parameters. Each 
feasible combination of the alternative values for war 
gaming parameters forms a different indirect weapon 
system. Since the number of alternatives becomes large if 
each of the war gaming parameters are used in the 
simulation, list is narrowed down in order to shorten the 
simulation time. The parameter list with the information 
whether the parameter is used in the simulation model is 
given in Table 1.
Cost and its variations
In order to find the optimal use of defense budget, different 
technical solutions have to be considered. There are many 
different features in military systems, and upgrading them 
adds the cost of the system. In order to compare different 
alternatives, we might use a process suggested in Figure 1.
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Table 1. Parameters list
Figure 1. In order to select the best combination, different 
alternatives and the cost of each subsystem should be studied. The 
parts in red circles were studied during this workshop.
All the weapon systems are combinations of different 
components, such as the shooting platform, ammunition and 
targeting system. In this study we had imaginary cost 
variations for each of these components, and we created a 
Nearly-Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOHL) to 
demonstrate the first part of the process. An example of such 
NOHL data set is presented in Table 2 and Figure 2.  We 
used “NOLH designs spreadsheet” provided by SEED 
















463 300 181 206 3 59 16
413 225 188 219 0 46 16
425 244 106 198 6 56 20
438 263 131 250 6 43 18
550 294 144 189 3 40 18
600 231 138 237 1 55 19
525 219 200 202 9 49 19
513 288 175 246 8 53 17
500 250 150 215 5 50 15
538 200 119 224 8 41 14
588 275 113 211 10 54 14
575 256 194 233 4 44 10
563 238 169 180 4 58 13
450 206 156 241 7 60 12
400 269 163 193 9 45 11
475 281 100 228 1 51 11
488 213 125 184 2 48 13
Table 2. Example of a NOHL data set of cost levels in one 
subsystem (shooting platform).
Figure 2. Different cost levels from 
NOHL total cost level combinations.
Assumptions for the Economical Model
• The life cycle of the weapon systems are considered to be 
20 years (between 2020 and 2040).
• During the life cycle, there is no need to make a 
technology insertion or upgrade to the weapon systems. 
However, some fuse types need upgrading. This is 
included in the life cycle cost.
• Training cost of the weapon systems are estimated 
according to the number of crew needed to operate the 
system.
• At least four teams for each weapon system are trained.
• Combination of systems is not studied; the simulations 
are run such that each time a single type of weapon 
system alternative is used.
• Simulation of communication network is not performed, 
it is just considered in the targeting performance of the 
weapon systems (i.e. the deviation of the ammunition 
from the target).
• Each fired ammunition incurs additional maintenance 
cost after each shot because of barrel wear.
• Electronic warfare precautions weapon systems and their 
cost are not considered in the scenario.
War Gaming
In the scope of this workshop, connection between the 
different cost levels and gaming were not combined at this 
work.
The war gaming was limited to one case, in which different 
indirect weapon systems were studied for only one target 
situation.
The scenario was selected from the 3rd International Sandis 
Workshop [2]. In the scenario, Blue battalion attacks to 
Kemijärvi airstrip, which has been taken by a Red reinforced 
mechanized company supported by an artillery battery. 
Indirect fire was studied in the second mission of the 
scenario [3]. The scenario was adjusted to fit the 
requirements of this study. The starting position of the 
scenario is presented in Figure 3, where the Red target unit is 
in the east side of the map.
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The requirement of the indirect fire system was to cause at 
least 30% casualties to enemy troops with at least 80% 
probability.
Figure 3. Initial positions with mortar systems on the map
Questions and Parameters
Using the cost level data, the following questions were 
studied:
• How much is the life cycle cost for the most appropriate 
future indirect fire weapon system that meets the 
performance measure?
• What are the requirements to meet the system 
performance (i.e. the number of ammunitions to fire, the 
maximum level of deviation)
• Which systems meet the performance requirements?
For indirect fire system, the following parameters were 
identified:
• Targeting systems (gives time from support request to 
fire)
o Remote targeting by target acquisition sensor or 
forwarded fire control unit
o Direct visual contact with enemy
o The time taken for discovering, establishing 
identity and coordinate of a target and reporting 
that info back to the firing unit is an important 
parameter
• Mobility
o Here both time for transportation of the firing unit 
on different types of road qualities and terrain 
types are important as well as time taken for 




• Hit precision for first shot
• Hit correction ability
o Within which time and with which precision will 
hit correction info be sent back to the firing unit
• EW robustness
o Issues like stealthiness and robustness against EW 
countermeasures. The last concerns both 
communication with infantry to be supported as 
well as own forwarded fire control units and sensor 
systems
• Communication with troops to be supported
o Bandwidth issues and perhaps radio channel 
collision. Also closely connected with EW 
robustness
• Munitions with hit accuracy (distance dependent or not 
etc.)
o Homing grenades like Excalibur (GPS guided) and 
Bonus (IR or LADAR guided)
• Robustness against enemy artillery/ambush
o Is our artillery armoured or not and if so, how 
much?
• Availability (when first requested and time during usage)
In the simulation, ammunition parameters were collected 
from open sources and the parameters selected for data 
farming were accuracy and targeting systems. In the war 
game, mobility and robustness against enemy artillery could 
be seen as enemy countermeasures.
Figure 4. Red uses its artillery against Blue mortars. Mobile 
mortars can change positions before firing and armored mortars 
won’t suffer as much damage.
In the analysis, only one system was studied at a time. The 
units were fixed so that they could reach the requirements 
despite the enemy countermeasures. In practice, number of 
shooting platforms was increased until the point the 
requirements were reached.
Simulation was conducted using Sandis software. 
Results
The average cost levels from the first part of the study were 
combined with the simulation results from the war gaming 
part. As a result, we got the cost needed for this single event, 
as presented in the Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Conclusions
Computational combat models can be used for cost 
effectiveness study in this case. If we would have a 
representative set of scenarios and large variation of 
different tactics within the scenarios, we would get a good 
insight of cost effectiveness of indirect fire systems.
In order to create robust and cost-effective indirect fire 
systems, the simulation loop presented in Figure 1 should be 
used. In this case we did only a small part of real analysis. 
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First, industrial and weaponry knowledge to combine cost-
levels with weapon systems features and parameters is 
needed. Secondly, military knowledge and different 
scenarios for possible future technologies are needed to 
create representative set of different future use situations of 
the weapon systems.
After this part, the data farming with good design of 
experiments, fast scenario prototyping, high-performance 
computing and result visualization is needed to create 
results as presented in Figures 5 and 6.
This analysis requires a considerable amount of manpower 
in all its stages. As the number of simulation runs will be 
large, the use of high-performance computing is essential.
As a detail, using the probability of success, instead of 
average values, was considered a good measure of 
effectiveness. However, some adjustments must be made to 
simulation software to automatically collect a distribution of 
data. For example, Sandis must be upgraded with automatic 
data collection.
Future Work
This sort of simulation is continued. The parameter set will 
be updated with national data sets and scenarios.
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Figure 5. List of weapon systems and cost levels. Weapon 
systems were used only in this single situation with only single 
distance between the target and each weapon system type. Thus, 
these results don’t represent the overall effectiveness.
Figure 6. The most cost-efficient alternatives with accurate 
targeting system (left side of Figure 5).
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Interagency, Interdisciplinary, and International 
"What If?" Questions
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On March 11, 2011 a complex disaster struck Japan in 
the form of an earthquake, a tsunami, and a damaged 
nuclear reactor.  IDFW 22/ MSG-088 Meeting 3 
convened during the aftermath of the Fukushima 
disaster.  Fukushima dominated many group 
discussions throughout the week, especially for those 
involved in developing humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HA/DR) scenarios.
• Were MSG-088 HA/DR scenarios realistic?
• Were simplified scenarios appropriate?
• Should future scenarios reflect some of the more 
complex interrelationships be adopted, with 
multiple concurrent causalities?
• By failing to address certain complexities in HA/
DR missions, are we failing to capture key 
planning factors?
In March 2011, Team 1 established three subgroups to 
explore a range of recent and prospective future HA/
DR scenario sets.  Team 3 is an extension of the March 
2011 mandates.
While initially unrelated, the Modeling and Simulation 
World Conference and Exposition was scheduled to 
convene October 11-14, 2011, in Virginia Beach, 
Virginia.  The MODSIM conference chose a theme of 
“Confronting Global Challenges.”  Three MSG-088 
participants chose to submit a paper to this conference 
entitled, “Data Farming and the Exploration of Inter-
agency, Inter-disciplinary, and International ‘What If?’ 
Questions.”  This conference paper was provided to 
Team 3 as a read-ahead, and Table 1, was provided as 
point of departure for team discussions.
• What topics did the team foresee as potential 
issues impacting regional and global security?
• Like Fukushima, are any of these topics likely to 
overlap or to occur concurrently?
• What methodologies and approaches could we 
identify to help explore future regional and global 
challenges?
Team 3 was a newly established team, and met for the 
first time in Riihimäki, Finland.
FRAMEWORK FORMULATION
The first challenge was to take a vague and nebulous 
set of ideas and to strive to establish a common 
framework for discussion and quantitative analysis. 
Significant brainstorming occurred during the first 
sessions.  Team members attempted to create 
adjacency matrixes.  Other members attempted to 
formulate “threaded topic linkages,” See Figures 1 and 
2.
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Figure 1 - Threaded Topic Linkage Matrix
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The list of topics had inconsistent time horizons. 
Further, the interrelationships and interdependencies 
between the topics were difficult to map.
Figure 2. Threaded Topic Linkage Flow
The more the Team studied Table 1, it became obvious 
that certain linkages among topics are plausible, and 
make sense.  Yet, certain redundancies led the team to 
make some generalizations and create a new schema 
topology. Ultimately, the group opinion was that 
“competition for scarce resources was the strongest 
common thematic across topic linkages. Resource 
competition formed the basis for scenario discussions.
LSM COMPUTER SIMULATION
The initial scenario proposed was a 2-player game 
competing over a single resource. See Figure 3. 
Significant discussions followed regarding 
mathematical representations that were both simple, 
yet able to capture subtle human behavioral 
characterizations. The algorithms were prototyped in a 
python computer program called the Limited Supply 
Model (LSM).
Figure 3. LSM Scenario Abstraction
• The LSM simulation was a static model of 
interaction between two states (S1 and S2).
• Developed to quantify potential competition over a 
single resource.
- Independent variables (parameterized)
- Resource availability
- S1 and S2 resource demand levels
• Metrics (output)
- PDM – proportion of demand meet-able
- SAT – satisfaction index
- AGR – aggression index
The three foundational equations developed were:
PDM = max(0, resource –  other demand) /  (own 
demand)
SAT = min(1, PDM^beta)
AGR = max(0, 1 – PDM^alpha)
The variable beta, was meant to serve as a generic 
“satisfaction rate” (how quickly your state reaches 
satisfaction once resources are provided).  The variable 
alpha, was meant to serve as a generic “crankiness 
rate” (how quickly your state becomes unhappy/
dissatisfied when resources are not fully available). 
The initial values used had beta = 2, and alpha = 3. 
Time did not allow the team to conduct a full 
parameter sensitivity analyses on these two variables. 
Initial indications are that beta should probably set to 
a value less than one.
The LSM program consists of six primary functions.
1. Create and initialize a list of states
2. Create shared resource pool
3. Calculate demand for each state object
4. Divide up resources amongst states
5. Calculate reaction variables based upon the 
amount of demand satisfied
6. Write output file




 states = [] # list of all states
 for i in range(numStates): #create set of states
  states.append(State(NAME="S"+repr(i)))
 
 outfile = genOutFile(states)
 for i in range(excusrions):
  sharedResource =
    random.uniform(0,maxResource)
  for s in states:
   s.setDemand()
  assignResouces(states, sharedResource)
  for s in states:
   s.createIndex()
  writeRunOut(outfile, sharedResource, states)
  for s in states:
   s.reset()
“State class” represents a nation-state, or group, with 
resource demands. The following python code was 
used to track name, satisfaction index, aggression 
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index, proportion of demand met, and amount of 
resource s allocated.
class State:
 def __init__(self, NAME):
  self.name = NAME
  self.SAT = 1 #quality of life
  self.aggression = 0
  self.demand = 1
  self.PDM = 1 #percent demand met
  self.got = 0
 def setDemand(self):
  self.demand = random.uniform(0,1)
 def satisfied(self, resource):
  self.got += resource
  if self.got >= self.demand:
   return True
  else:
   return False
 def createIndex(self):
  self.PDM = max(0, self.got/self.demand)
  if self.PDM <= 1:
   self.SAT = self.PDM**beta
   self.aggression = 1 - self.PDM**alpha
 def reset(self):
  self.SAT=1
  self.aggression = 0
  self.demand = 1
  self.PDM = 1
  self.got = 0
The assignResources() routine, selects competing states 
(e.g., S1, S2) from a list.  Each state is given an 
incremental quantity of the shared resource pool. 
States continue to compete for resources until  the pool 
is depleted, or all state’s demands are satisfied.
def assignResouces(stateList, resources):
 happyStates = []
 while resources >= nibbleRate and stateList != []:
# pick a state
  thisState = random.choice(stateList) 
#give some, and see if we have all we need
  if (thisState.satisfied(nibbleRate)) == True: 
   i = stateList.index(thisState)
#if so, move to happy set
   happyStates.append(stateList.pop(i)) 
  resources -= nibbleRate
#allocate that last little bit
 if resources > 0 and stateList != []: 
  random.choice(stateList).satisfied(resources)
# merge groups again
 stateList += happyStates 
RESULTS
The output from the LSM tool produced flat files.  The 
team used JMP® visualization software1  to display 
LSM output.  Figures 4 display how changes in 
resource availability are reflected by State 1’s 
satisfaction index.
Figure 4. Sample/Example LSM Output
Figure 5. Sample/Example LSM Output
Figure 5 displays how S2’s resource demand 
requirements impact S1’s satisfaction index. 
Figure 6 displays the interrelationships between S1 
and S2 resource demands, resource availability,  and 
their satisfaction indexes.
The insights gleaned by this relatively simple tool 
were interesting and warrant additional research.  The 
topology space of this characterization of a simple 2-
player game competing over a single resource was still 
statistically complex and interesting.
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1 JMP® is a registered trademark of SAS Institute, Inc.
• There was a high degree of correlation between 
satisfaction and aggressiveness indexes.
• As resources become more constrained, states 
gravitate towards low satisfaction/ high 
aggression, especially as state resource demands 
increase
Figure 6. Sample/Example LSM Output
SUMMARY
By the conclusion of the week the end of the week, 
Team 3 arrived at the following conclusions and 
recommendations.
• It appears that many regional and global issues are 
predicated upon competition for scarce resources.
• It seems possible to characterize the foreign 
policies of nation states using simple supply and 
demand constructs.
• Experiment with model parameterization
• Design of experiments (rather than random 
selection of independent variable values)
• More logic is required in the model to before it can 
adequately address m actors competing for n 
resources (m x n problem space).
- Multibody problem
- Multi-resource problem
• More work is needed to “calibrate” foreign policy 
decision weighting behaviors of specific nation 
states, if we seek to model the community of 
nations.
- Unfulfilled demands of nation states became 
a key driver in our foreign policy model.
- Better, more realistic resource allocation 
schemes
- Tie resource allocation to aggression levels
- Other metrics besides aggression, satisfaction 
indexes
- Evolutionary behavior over time (difference/
differential equations)
• Significant effort must be invested to access global 
resource data to reflect current realities.
• More work is needed to explore 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
order effects of certain resources to show 
interdependencies (e.g, lack of rainfall  impacts 
local agriculture production and potable water 
supplies, local droughts may lead to acute need for 
fuel to provide transportation, lack of potable 
water may lead to mass migration, etc.)
Special thanks to the Finnish Defence Forces Research 
Centre for their hospitality and support throughout 
this workshop.
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IDFW 23 Plenaries and Events
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Monday, 19 September
• IDFW 23/MSG-088 Meeting 5 Opening and Welcome to 
Finland: Dr. Gary Horne and BG Veli Pekka Valtonen
• Logistics and Host Nation Comments: Dr. Bernt Åkesson
• Keynote Speaker: COL Mika Hyytiäinen
• Keynote Speaker: Mr. Seppo Härkönen
• Elevator Briefs: Team Leaders
• Poster Session
Tuesday, 20 September
• Data Farming for New Members and History of Data 
Farming: Gary Horne and Klaus-Peter Schwierz
• SEED Center Update and Design of Experiments: Susan 
Sanchez and Paul Sanchez
• Data Farming in Support of Strategic Operational Analysis 
(Two Sessions - Tuesday & Thursday): Juhani Hämäläinen
• NATO Meeting: Modeling & Simulation Task Group 088: 
Gary Horne and Stephan Seichter
IDFW 23 Plenaries and Events
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Wednesday, 21 September
• Operational Availability and Materiel Availability 
Modeling and Analysis for Complex Military 
Systems: Craig Lawton
• Collaborative Processes in Data Farming: 
Klaus-Peter Schwierz
• Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems 
Engineering using Opinion Dynamics on Social 
Networks: Pat Finley and Tom Moore
• Social Event: Dinner at Rönnvik Vineyard
Friday, 23 September
• Team Brief Outs
• IDFW 24 / MSG-088 Meeting 7 
Preview: Dr. Susan Sanchez
• IDFW 23 / MSG-088 Meeting 5 
Closing Ceremony
Team 4: NATO MSG-088 Data Farming In Support Of 
NATO Case Study on Force Protection
TEAM 04 MEMBERS
























In 2010, the NATO Modeling and Simulation Task Group 
"Data Farming in Support of NATO" (MSG-088) has been 
established with the goal of assessing the data farming 
capabilities that NATO, PfP, and Contact Countries, schools, 
and agencies have as well as to find out in which way these 
capabilities can contribute to the development of improved 
decision support to NATO forces.
As part of the "Program of Work" of MSG-088, proof-of-
concept explorations regarding questions and models of 
interest to NATO nations are to be conducted, with the 
objective of illustrating the power of data farming for 
decision support. In order to realize this MSG-088 objective, 
the task group has planned to set up two case studies. One of 
those is taking place in the area of "Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)", whereas the second case 
study works on the topic "Force Protection". For those two 
case studies, two NATO working groups have been 
established, both contributing to IDFW. 
During IDFW23, Team 4 represented the MSG-088 case 
study team "Force protection".
The proposed scenario topic for the "Force Protection" study 
deals with the effective protection of a combat outpost 
(COP), possibly with the support of joint fire assets, in an 
Afghan mission setting against strong and coordinated 
insurgent forces.
The entire "Force Protection" scenario has been defined at the 
previous NMSG-088 meeting   2   /   IDFW 22 workshop 
including the questions we want to answer using data 
farming, the measures of effectiveness and the list of all 
input parameters that should examined. In preparation for 
the NMSG-088 meeting   4   /   IDFW   23, the scenario was 
implemented using the German agent based sensor and 
effector model PAXSEM and was reviewed at the NMSG-088 
meeting 3 in Istanbul, Turkey in July 2011. Afterwards, data 
farming experiments with the created scenario as well as 
with the defined DoE using a "Nearly Balanced Nearly 
Orthogonal Mixed Design" was conducted with PAXSEM in 
order to perform statistical analysis with the simulation 
results at this workshop.
The Overall Question
The overall question that has been agreed upon to 
investigate in this context is the following: 
"Which tactics / equipment is most robust 
against different kinds of threats?"
To answer that question, the following three subquestions 
have been defined:
1. Is there a COP configuration that performs consistently 
well?
2. What is the most dangerous threat and how does the 
robust COP work for that threat?
3. Under which circumstances can joint fire support 
improve the survivability of the COP? (Find out 
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necessary requirements e.g. early availability of joint 
fire)
The initially stated general question also contains the 
investigation of the chosen solution's robustness. To also 
incorporate this aspect, the approach agreed upon was to 
run the different COP setups or strategies, that are to be 
tested according to the questions above, against different 
kinds of insurgent threats and from these results compute 
the average performance of a specific COP setup.
Scenario Description
The general scenario setup can be described as follows:
A COP is set up next to an Afghan village. It is equipped 
with various sensor and weapon systems, which help to 
identify enemies and to protect itself. The sensors as well as 
the effectors are placed inside and outside of the COP. 
Sensors inside the COP may be positioned e.g. on set-up 
watchtowers or placed on vehicles, whereas an external 
sensor could be positioned at a observation point (OP) on a 
nearby hill to get a better overview over the area. 
Additionally, the COP has access to UAVs, which can be used 
to scan the area, and also sends out patrols, which provide the 
possibility to detect enemies before they attack the COP.
In terms of effectors, the COP on the one hand has access 
to weapon systems stationed inside the COP, like the soldiers' 
rifles, mortars and effectors placed on the vehicles stationed 
inside the COP. From outside the COP, joint fire support in 
form of helicopters, fixed wing aircrafts or artillery can be 
called in, once a suitable target has been identified.
The red forces on the other hand apply two kinds of 
tactics to attack the COP. They either attack in the form of 
homogenous long distance attacks with the help of mortars or 
sniper rifles, or they approach the COP in the form of a force-
on-force attack, seeking direct confrontation.
The course of action in this scenario is that the soldiers 
inside the COP try to have a good overview over the area 
around them, and try to reconnoiter enemies either through 
patrols, UAVs or stationary sensors placed in and around the 
COP. The insurgents on the other hand try to attack the COP 
with different tactics. As soon as the attackers have been 
reconnoitered by the soldiers, countermeasures can be 
applied, like sending out a Quick Reaction Team (QRT), 
defending themselves from inside the COP with help of rifles, 
mortars or other effectors, or by calling in joint fire support.
Figure 1: Scenario: force-on-force attack on COP
Measures of Effectiveness
The following MOEs (Measures of Effectiveness) have been 
identified as being suitable to actually identify the 
performance of the course of action in terms of the formerly 
formulated overall question:
How to define successful protection of COP?
• No blue casualties 
è MOE: percentage of blue losses
• No insurgents within small arms fire distance
è MOE: count the number of INS within given 
environment
• How long can the COP hold out until 
reinforcement / joint fire support arrives?
è MOE: count number of blue casualties within 
certain period of time
è MOE: ammunition spent
How to measure robustness?
• Steady success against varying strength / 
capabilities / tactics of INS
• Specify a target function considering weighed MOEs
General Scenario Assumptions
In defining the rough outline of the scenario, a few 
assumptions had to be made regarding the scenario in order 
to keep the investigation focused on the formerly defined 
questions. These assumptions include:
• The COP in question is generally meant to be a small, 
platoon-size COP, as attacks on large, heavily 
fortified COPs are highly unlikely.
• Though generally regarded as an important factor in 
such missions, no explicit modeling of 
communication between the different entities of the 
blue forces will be done.
• Intelligence processes won't be modeled, but the 
presence of intelligence results will be considered in 
the initial scenario setup.
• In the first step, no civilians will be modeled, as the 
involvement of these would make the scenario too 
complicated.
• The COP will be set up in the terrain next to a 
village. This implies that the COP can not attack the 
insurgents as soon as they retreat to the village 
(prevention of collateral damage).
• The COP's objectives have been defined as "Observe 
the surrounding" and "Show presence". None of the 
more complex tasks that are usually assigned to 
COPs, like setting up road checkpoints or building a 
relationship with the civilian population, are 
depicted in the scenario.
Defining Input Parameters
For the described scenario, various input parameters have 
been defined that are deemed likely to have an influence on 
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the course of the scenario and the outcome in terms of the 
formerly defined MOEs.
On the blue side, the parameters to vary can be 
summarized as follows:
• The number of sensors, effectors and vehicles at the 
COP's disposal
• The number of patrols that are being sent out by the 
COP
• Number, availability, latency and effector parameters 
of helicopters, fixed wings and artillery that can be 
used as joint fire support
• The number, type and tactics of UAVs working for 
the COP
• The number and type of stationary sensors inside 
and outside the COP
• The blue force's tactics in case they are under attack
• The proficiency of the soldiers inside the COP
• Availability of intelligence reports
On the red side, the parameters to vary are the following:
• Change between long distance and force-on-force 
attacks
• In case of long distance attacks, the number of 
attackers and their likelihood after firing to stay in 
their position or to change it
• In case of force-on-force attacks, the constellation of 
the attacking force, whether it is more small groups 
attacking or one large group of insurgents
• Effectors used by the attackers
• The insurgents' strength and proficiency
Due to the mixture and combination of the chosen input 
parameters, of which some are numerical and others 
categorical, the "Nearly Balanced Nearly Orthogonal Mixed 
Design" was chosen, which was developed at the NPS. With 
this design it will be possible to reduce the initially 
calculated number of 9 * 1027 design points based on the 26 
decision and 15 noise factors to a number of 5610 design 
points.
Results
The working team built a major analysis plan consisting of 
the following steps:
1. Check the ranges of simulation output / MOEs
2. Check distribution of input parameters
3. Check correlations using multivariate plots for 
numerical factors / contingency tables for categorical 
factors to check correlations and the validity of design
4. Descriptive statistics to validate output data
5. Generate loss functions
6. Check partition tree to find out most important factors 
(including all factors)
7. Do regression analysis through stepwise linear 
regression (choosing leave labels of partition tree) taking 
into account continuous factors
8. Determine threshold between important / unimportant 
factors
9. How to set factors to achieve lowest level of blue losses
All these steps have been done using SAS JMP. The interesting 
details are described in the following sections.
Robust Analysis
To answer the first subquestion 
"Is there a COP configuration that 
performs consistently well?"
a robust analysis was conducted using the MOE "BlueLoss" . 
The goal of the robust analysis was to look for a COP 
configuration that simultaneously yields good average 
performance and low variability through all kind of threats.
The following two alternatives to perform the robust 
analysis on the MOE "BlueLoss" have been considered:
The first alternative uses a loss function that captures the 
average performance and volatility, looking for consistent 
good performance. The loss function should have a target 
value that represents a desirable and achievable value e.g. 
5% blue losses. Therefore the quadratic loss function 
floss(BluesLoss) = (BlueLoss -0.05)2 
was used as the target value for a  regression analysis, to find 
the most influencing factors to minimize the loss function.
The second alternative is to compute the mean and standard 
deviation for  the MOE "BlueLoss" grouped by all decision 
factors. Then two separate regressions are performed to find 
the most influencing factors: one regression for the mean and 
one regression for the standard deviation of the blue losses 
as a response factor considering all decision factors.
Both alternatives led to similar  results. Using the given loss 
function for  the blue losses and performing a regression tree 
(see figure 2), the following decision factors were identified to 
be most important:
The ammunition supply, the soldier's proficiency level, the 
number of medium machine guns and guided rockets need to 
be maximized.
Figure 2: Part of the regression tree 
on the loss function for blue losses
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An additional regression analysis did not enhance the 
insights. But adding the number of blue forces to the model 
improved the robust results which shows, that the overall 
force size is important to survivability of the COP.
Robust COP Configuration for Most 
Dangerous Threat
To answer the second subquestion 
"What is the most dangerous threat and how does the robust 
COP work for that threat?"
the most dangerous threat has to be identified first.
Therefore a partition tree was build using the previous loss 
function (target value 5%) but now considering all noise 
factors as input factors. This showed that certain insurgent 
configurations (e.g. the long distance attack with many 
indirect fire weapons) result in the highest blue losses (mean 
of 88% of blue losses).
The intersection of the subset of most dangerous insurgent 
configuration with the subset of the most robust COP 
configuration shows the requested COP performance on the 
most dangerous threat. Looking at the distribution of blue 
losses showed, that the most robust COP does substantially 
reduce the blue losses (mean of 44% of blue losses). See figure 
3.
Figure 3: Distribution of blue losses of the most robust COP 
against the most dangerous threat
Scenario improvements
Trying to answer the third subquestion about the impact of 
fire support assets showed that the request for fire support in 
the scenario was always requested way too late so that there 
was almost no impact on the simulation outcome. Because this 
doesn't reflect the reality some minor scenario changes have 
been defined, so that the fire support may be requested earlier:
• The UAV and sensor towers may detect any suspicious 
persons or vehicles. At this point, fire support assets may 
already be requested for preparation
• To be able to identify the insurgents and immediately call 
for fire support, a quick reaction team (QRT) is send out 
of the COP after the detection to perform the 
identification
These scenario modifications shall be implemented until the 
next IDFW24 / NMSG-088 Meeting 6 in Monterey in March 
2012, to continue the analysis using the new result data of the 
updated farming experiment.
SUMMARY AND FURTHER STEPS
Great progress could be achieved during this week of 
collaborative work and important steps towards conducting 
the case study "Force Protection" could be made. Due to all 
the valuable inputs from experts in the military, DoE and 
M&S fields, it has been possible to conduct a  first analysis on 
the data  farming results to answer the first two of the three 
subquestions of this case study. We are on a good way to 
show how the data farming methodology is capable to be 
used to answer analysis questions in the military area.
Currently, the further plans for the "Force Protection" case 
study is to implement the necessary scenario modifications 
into the model PAXSEM and to conduct the data farming 
experiments with the modified scenario as well as with the 
adjusted DoE. So the results of these experiments will be 
presented for analysis at next IDFW24 / NMSG-088 Meeting 6 
in Monterey in March 2012.
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INTRODUCTION
In a typical simulation experiment, the analysts try to 
estimate the means of various performance measures, e.g., 
waiting times, operational availability, or life cycle cost.  
However the decision makers are usually more concerned 
with the quantile estimators, or the risk (probability) of the 
measurement falls below (or above) a certain threshold 
point.    For example, the aviation squadron commander is 
more interested in estimating the risk that the operational 
availability (Ao) falls below certain threshold value such as 
the probability that less than 80% of the aircraft are mission-
capable than an average operational availability. In this 
paper we present a methodology to identify significant 
factors that are critical for risk assessment for readiness and 
the life cycle cost.  
CASE STUDY
We develop a hypothetical fighter aircraft, F-XX, acquisition, 
operation and maintenance case and create a companion 
spreadsheet model to estimate the life cycle cost and 
readiness (or operational availability).  The case will be 
briefly described in the next section.  
The Case and the Spreadsheet Model
We plan to acquire a total of 96 new fighter aircraft, F-XX, 
that will be divided into eight squadrons.  The F-XX 
program life cycle is estimated to be 30 years. The manning 
requirements are as follows:  
Pilots and Ground Support Personnel (per squadron):
-! 17 ! Pilots
-! 4 ! Ground Support Officers
-! 16 ! Non-commissioned Officers (NCO)
-!176 ! Enlisted
Headquarters Personnel:
-! 2 ! [CO (commanding officer) and XO (executive 
! ! officer) (both are pilots)]
-! 1 ! Admin Officer (non-pilot)
-! 2 ! NCOs
-! 4 ! Enlisted
The personnel costs are based on the DoD standard 
composite pay that includes standard benefits (housing, 
food, medical, etc. not including re-enlistment bonuses, 
combat pay, etc.).   See http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
comptroller/rates/fy2011/2011_k.pdf. All F-XX personnel 
will require both basic and advanced levels of training. The 
manpower annual turnover rate is estimated to be 20% and 
additional personnel must be trained due to attrition.  The 
cost for non-pilot basic training is estimated to be $2,000/ 
week/person, and advanced training, $3,000/week/person. 
For pilot training, it costs $11,000/week/person for both 
basic and advanced training.  Required training times for 
pilots and ground maintenance personnel, and headquarters 
personnel are as follows:








36 weeks 12 weeks
12 weeks 2 weeks
12 weeks 2 weeks
24 weeks 24 weeks
Headquarters Personnel
! Basic Admin Training (Officers, NCOs, enlisted):! 10 wks
! Advanced Admin Training (Officers and NCOs):!  3 wks
Management of spare parts will be on a  one-for-one 
exchange at the Squadron Level (organizational level or O-
level).  It takes one day to swap the failed component with a 
spare part if available.  Otherwise the aircraft will be 
grounded until an RFI (ready-for-issue) spare part becomes 
available.  An average waiting time for an RFI spare part is 
assumed to be 50% of the depot repair turnaround time.  A 
failed component is sent to the contractor-managed depot 
for repair.  The depot turnaround time is estimated to be 40 
days.  Each aircraft will go through preventive maintenance 
every 5 years which takes an average of 3 months. 
Each squadron’s activity has start-up fixed costs, which are 
incurred at $10,000,000 per activity prior to squadron 
activation.  Additionally, operating variable costs, which are 
estimated at $5,000,000/yr per O-level activity, are incurred 
for each year a squadron is operational.  
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In this study we will consider the 6 major critical 
components as shown in Table 1. The MTBFs (mean time 
between failures) and the unit costs for the components are 
as follows:
Component Name MTBF Unit Cost
Auxiliary Power Unit 250 $100,000
Generator 400 $ 250,000
Radar 1000 $ 400,000
Avionic Computer 1000 $ 500,000
Landing Gear 500 $ 400,000
Engine 500 $ 2,000,000
Table 1. The MTBF and the Unit Cost of the Six Major 
Critical Components for F-XX Aircraft
Each aircraft is expected to fly an average of 40 hours per 
month, and the cost for Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant 
(POL)!  is! estimated to be $2,000 per flying hour. 
Each copy of the F-XX has an average unit cost of $50 
million. Support equipment costs $20,000 per aircraft.  These 
one-time costs are incurred when the F-XXs are phased into 
the squadrons.   The expected salvage value of each aircraft 
at the end of the life cycle is estimated to be $5 million, 10% 
of the procurement unit cost.    An annual capital discount 
rate of 7 is used to compute the present value of the life cycle 
cost. 
We have developed a spreadsheet model to compute the life 
cycle cost and the operational availability of this F-XX case. 
A sample screenshot of the user-interface page of the model 
is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. A Sample Screenshot of the F-XX Life Cycle Cost and 
Readiness Spreadsheet User-Interface Page
The Significant Factors
We consider the six critical components (engine, landing 
gear, avionic computer, aux power unit, radar, and 
generator) as shown in Table 1 for this study.  When any of 
these components fails, the faulty part is removed from the 
aircraft, a spare is installed and the faulty part is sent to the 
repair facility (contractor-managed depot).  After the repair 
is complete, the repaired part becomes a spare and is sent to 
the spare pool.  When a critical part fails, and a spare is not 
available, the aircraft will be non-operational and grounded 
until a spare becomes available.  
We have chosen the following 10 factors to be significant for 
the readiness and life cycle cost of the program.    
• 6 components’ MTBFs (or reliabilities)
• Flight hours (Operational Tempo)
• Cost of POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant)
• Depot maintenance TAT (turnaround time)
• Preventive maintenance TAT (PMTAT) 
The ranges of these 10 factors for the design of experiment 
are provided in Table 2, which include the MTBFs of the 
individual parts, along with the ranges of the cost of POL, 
flight hours (FLHRS), depot turnaround time (DTAT), and 
preventive maintenance (PMTAT) turnaround time.  Since 
the average operational tempo during the peace time is 
approximately 350 hours per year, and during the war time, 
is approximately 650 hours per year, we set the range of the 
operational tempo from 300 to 700 hours per year.  Our 
spreadsheet model estimates the life-cycle cost and the 
average operational availability.  
Input Parameter Range
MTBF1 (aux power unit) 125 – 500 flight hours 
MTBF2 (generator) 200 – 800 flight hours
MTBF3 (radar) 500 – 2,000 flight hours
MTBF4 (avionic computer) 500 -2,000 flight hours
MTBF5 (landing gear) 250 – 1,000 flight hours
MTBF6 (engine) 250 – 1,000 flight hours
POL ($/ flight hour) $1,000 – $4,000
Flight Hours/ month 20 – 80 hours per month
DTAT (Depot turnaround time) 30 – 60 days
PMTAT (preventive maintenance 
turnaround time) 45 – 180 days
Table 2. Ranges of Input Parameters
We use an NOLH (Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube) 
with 257 runs (Cioppa and Lucas 2006).  This design is 
capable of handling up to 29 factors without increasing the 
number of scenarios. It can be easily constructed by entering 
the low and high values in Table 2 into a spreadsheet 
(Sanchez 2006). (We remark that that 10 input factors could 
be examined using a NOLH with as few as 33 scenarios if the 
time required for  257 runs was prohibitively long.)  Because 
our model runs quickly, we opt for a larger design to allow a 
more detailed investigation of our model’s behavior. We 
have developed a macro written in Visual Basic that 
computes the life cycle cost and the operational availability 
for each scenario.  
RESULTS
We fit regression meta-models of the life cycle cost as a 
function of the 10 main effects, and two-way interaction of 
the 10 input factors using the JMP® software package (SAS 
2008).  After noticing the impact on several factors not 
significant we picked 4 significant factors for further 
analysis.  These are ENG (MTBF of engine), POL (cost of 
POL), FLHRS (flight hours), and DTAT (depot turnaround 
time).  Then we fit regression metamodel of the life cycle cost 
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as a function these 4 main effects and two-way interaction of 
these 4 input factors.  The results are shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Sorted Parameter Estimates from 
JMP Analysis for Life Cycle Cost
As shown in Figure 2, the flight hours (FLHRS) and the POL 
cost are the major factors that affect the life cycle cost.  Also 
the two-way interaction between these factors has significant 
impact on life cycle cost.  It is intuitively correct since as the 
POL cost and the flight hours increase at the same time, there 
is an accelerated impact on the increase of the life cycle cost. 
Depot turnaround time (DTAT), engine MTBF (ENG) and 
other two-way interaction factors are not much critical as far 
as the life cycle cost is concerned.  
The interaction plot, shown in Figure 3, consists of several 
small subplots that indicate how the predicted performance 
(LCC) varies as a function of pairs of input factors (ENG, 
POL, FLHRS and DTAT).  It clearly shows how the POL and 
FLHRS are the most significant contributing factors for the 
life cycle cost. 
Figure 3. Interaction Plots
We also conducted the same regression meta-model analysis 
for the operational availability.  PMTAT (preventive 
maintenance turnaround time or RESET) is by far the most 
significant factor as shown in Figure 4.  FLHRS and DTAT 
are also critical factors in determining Ao. As they increase 
the flight hours, Ao deteriorates.  Also as the depot 
turnaround time (DTAT) increases, the more assets would be 
non-operarable and Ao would decrease. Two way interaction 
between these two factors are also significant. All other two 
way interactions are not significant.  
Figure 4. Sorted Parameter Estimates from 
JMP Analysis for Readiness
RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk assessment discussed in this section is still a   work-in-
progress. We impose the uniform distributions to the 10 
factors with the lower and upper bounds as appeared in the 
right-hand-side column (Range column) in Table 2.  Then we 
use the Crystal Ball® software package (Oracle, 2011) to 
conduct Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the distribution 
of Ao and LCC.  Based on 100,000 simulation replications, 
the simulation results are shown in Figures 5 for Ao and 
Figure 6 for the life cycle cost.  The average Ao is 89.8% with 
the probability that Ao falls below 87% is 0.133 (red area in 
Figure 5). The average life cycle cost is $10.393 billion, with 
the probability that the life cycle cost falls over $11 billion is 
0.196 (red area in Figure 6).  Also see the Base scenario 
column in Table 2.  
Figure 5. A Crystal Ball Simulation Output for the Distribution of 
Operational Availability (Base Scenario)
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Figure 6. A Crystal Ball Output for the Distribution of Life Cycle 
Cost (Base Scenario)
The analyses in the previous section show that preventive 
maintenance turnaround time (PMTAT) is by far the most 
critical factor to Ao, but has no impact on life cycle cost at all. 
(See Figures 4 and 5.) We want to see the impact of 
variability in depot turnaround time on readiness risk.  In 
the previous simulation, uniform distribution with a 
minimum of 45 days and a maximum of 180 days was used 
for PMTAT for the base case. For the embellishment, we 
change the PMTAT to be a constant value of 112.5 days (the 
average of the uniform distribution used in the base 
scenario), i.e., no variability.  We then run Monte Carlo 
simulation again.
Table 2. Simulation Results 
(Base Scenario and Embellishment) 
Figure 7. A Crystal Ball Simulation Output for the 
Distribution of Operational Availability (Embellishment)
The simulation results are summarized in Table 2.  Reducing 
variability in PMTAT significantly reduces the risk of 
operational availability falling below 87%  from 0.133 down 
to 0.026, while the average Ao remains the same at 89.8%. 
As shown in Figure 7, the shape of the distribution of the 
operational availability has drastically changed from Figure 
5. Also the variance of the distribution was substantially 
reduced.  On the other hand, the distribution of the life cycle 
cost in Figure 8 is the same as that in Figure 6 indicating that 
PMTAT does not have any impact on the life cycle cost.
Figure 8. A Crystal Ball Output for the 
Distribution of Life Cycle Cost (Embellishment)
FINAL REMARKS
As mentioned before this paper is a work-in-progress.  We 
will conduct more thorough analysis on risk assessment on 
different factors with wide range of values. The results will 
be published in the follow-up paper.   
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The application of social network analysis (SNA) to 
understand emergence within simulations with human 
actors is not a new concept but one that has gained a lot of 
attention in recent years. Graph methods and network 
analysis has the potential  to provide new views into our 
modeling efforts across multiple fields: insurgency, combat 
communication systems, logistics and distribution in 
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and other 
models that can potentially represent emergent interactive 
behaviors. 
In previous IDFWs, the 2010 Fall Simulation Interoperability 
Workshop (SIW), and the 2011 Military Operations Research 
Society (MORS) Symposium, team members developed and 
presented preliminary work on the application of basic SNA 
tools and techniques to simulation data to determine the 
feasibility of the approach. Initially, team members were to 
consider the following potential activities for the workshop’s 
effort:
• Use illustrative models with inherent social networks to 
continue defining and improving methods for analyzing 
networks and social network behavior model output 
from data farming;
• Continue to develop a well-defined illustrative insurgent 
and Improvised Explosive Device scenario that can be 
used to stress these techniques; and
• Examine and categorize the applicability of these 
techniques to other modeling endeavors.
Background
The initial context for this activity has been insurgent 
warfare and Counter-Improvised Explosive Devise (C-IED) 
efforts. In previous workshops Team 6 began working on an 
Afghanistan village scenario to address the second bullet. 
The team has taken methodical steps using the Pythagoras 
model to build components of a complete village model. 
During previous workshops, the team:
• Demonstrated the ability to identify, extract, and 
visualize emergent complex networks from simple and 
complex agent-based scenarios;
• Examined the usage of  SNA statistics extracted from the 
emergent networks in illustrative scenarios as a  basis for 
data farming. These statistics were explored in detail to 
determine which MOEs would be most beneficial for 
analyzing the types of networks produced by our agent 
based model;
• Investigated the variability of network statistics due to 
small changes in initial conditions; and
• Studied the velocity of information through a network in 
an effort to understand the appropriate temporal scaling 
required to answer real-world questions in the village 
scenario.
IDFW 23 Goals
On examining the proposed activities, the team decide to 
address a general SNA question that has specific impact on 
the village scenario. Three periodic networks are inherent in 
the scenario and previous studies: the village women, the 
village men, and the village families, which consist of the 
union of the first two.
The differences in some of the attributes of these three 
networks is represented illustratively in Figure 1. In the 
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Figure 1 -Three integrated networks with independent densities.
figure the village women can be represented by the red 
nodes on the left side of the figure (Network A). The men are 
represented by the blue nodes (Network B). Network C adds 
the links between the men and the women.
Hypothetically, the women’s environment promotes more 
interaction across the full  village female population. There 
are few barriers to cross-communication. The men tend to 
lead more “stove-piped” lives oriented toward work, which 
leads t a less dense network. Network C represents the 
notion that men and women don’t communicate outside of 
their families. The result is In Figure 1, this leads to three 
networks with very different densities. 
Network density is the ratio of the number of existing links 
to the number of possible links. In the example, Network A 
has a density of 0.284, Network B is 0.099, and Network C is 
1.078. This variability in density has important potential 
impact on how we might choose to use networks to 
communicate ideas effectively. By taking advantage of 
differential structural characteristics between subnetworks, 
interventions can be effected more efficiently. And, by taking 
advantage of pre-existing differential characteristics in 
opinion distributions, difficult to target networks may be 
made addressable indirectly.
Out goal was to build an experiment that would allow us to 
discover where in parametric space the phenomenon either 
holds or falls apart.
Focused Village Scenario
Montgomery McFate, author of landmark papers that 
codified the Human Terrain Team concept, said "We can't 
have effective strategy without cultural knowledge.  If you 
look at the problems we've had — in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Vietnam, and Somalia — they've been based on flawed 
assumptions about who those people are.“ Marine Corps 
Female Engagement Teams have had some success in 
winning the hearts and minds of Afghan natives, in part, 
because they leverage the culturally inherent network in 
villages. Regarding FETs, the question that his experiment is 
focusing on is: “How does the relative network density of 
male and woman cliques and groups affect the movement of 
opinion (inclination, ideas, etc.) across networks?”
Figures 2 and 3 represents the human terrain experiment 
that was designed to specifically address this intent. Again, 
the model represented the Afghan Village men and women, 
but this time in a more abstract sense. The two groups, men 
and women, are generalized into groups that possess 
different potential network connectivity and density. The 
overlapping union of men and women has yet another 
network state. 
The figures represent two abstract views of the model. In 
Figure 2, color space is used to break out a set of four male 
non-intersecting networks which each overlap with the 
female network. The overlap of each male network with the 
female represents family relationships. In Figure 3 the 
“spatial” view is represented. Again, the male and female 
groups are overlapping. Both the male and female networks 
densities can be adjusted by a combination of parameters, 
which can be “tuned” independently. None of the agents 
currently move “spatially.”
This experiment was initially data farmed over variations in 
the parameters that affect the women’s network density, in 
this case the range of the “chat” communication and the 
distance in “personality” space that is considered to be a 
link. The time to convergence and pervasiveness of a 
message injected by a FET is examined visually over the 
variation to the parameters.  The purpose was to provide a 
varying range of network densities to investigate impact of 
density differencs on the movement (limit, speed) of a 
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Figure 2 - Statistical distribution of Pythagoras’ agent color 
attributes are used to define the potential network links. 
Figure 3 - Distribution and density of agents in 
space determine in conjunction with the range of 
communication affect the network density.
“message” (opinion, inclination, feeling, beliefs) from a 
source through networks of varying density. Initially, we 
data farmed over the chat range using values of 50, 75, 100, 
and 125.
IDFW 23 Results
The time to convergence and pervasiveness of a  message 
injected by a FET is examined visually over the variation to 
the parameters. Figures 4 and 5 show the results of the chat 
range at 50 and 100, respectively. As expected, the higher 
density female network (chat range 100) resulted in the 
message being more pervasively distributed, more quickly 
into the male network. 
Figure 6 and 7 show time series of the impact of the red 
message dissemination. Dissemination is mostly complete by 
time step 60 in most cases. But it is noted that one male 
group never receives the message until the range is 125. 
After initial analysis it has been decided that the model 
needs to be adjusted to incorporate concepts of individual 
variation and stability to account for real-world variations in 
networks. 
Way Ahead
The research into this experiment is still in progress. 
Continued analysis and data farming will  drill  down into 
variations in the male network density to better understand 
how message distribution rates are correlated to the relative 
densities of the networks.  Also, adjustment will be made to 
the model to better represent the links between the male and 
female networks. Team members intend to follow-up on this 
research as feasible.
Team 6 has demonstrated the utility of incorporating social 
network analysis techniques into the data farming 
environment. It is our expectation that these techniques, if 
applied more broadly to agent-based modeling efforts that 
are not necessarily focused on “social” questions, will 
provide new perspectives on agent interaction and a deeper 
understanding of the “why?” of model results. 
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Figure 4: Range = 50
Figure 5: Range = 100
Figure 6 - Range 100
Figure 7 - Range 125
Focus Group: Data Farming in Support of 
Strategic Operational Analysis
FOCUS GROUP
Hämäläinen J. S., PVTT
Finland
Introduction 
Data farming is a subject independent powerful 
computational method. Data farming supplies tools for 
perceiving behavior of the models and visualization of the 
results with large number of parameter combinations. 
Applying data farming to new subjects supports modeling 
and understanding of the question. By considering given 
question with possibility of data farming simultaneously, the 
modeling process becomes more problem centric and faster. 
This leads to data farmable models which provide more 
information for the original question as well.
Working Method 
In IDFW 23 a focus group discussed on data farming in 
support of strategic operational analysis. Working method of 
the group was “round table” dialog conducted with 
prepared ideas. The group met twice during the week and 
work proceeded iteratively. However, two dialog sessions 
with iterative briefing appeared to be effective method, see 
also Figure 1. In the discussion, different ideas will be taken 
into account for instance to find analogies between models of 
different subjects and interests. During the IDFW 23, work 
done in Team No. 3  appeared to be closely related to this 
methodological approach, see these proceedings. 
Observations of Dialog
Discussions and the documentation of the work provided 
some general information on approach from wide question 
to model frame. 
• In the beginning, it is important 
to approach the problem with 
open mind and not to fixate in 
details, “a brainstorm”. 
• Associations and analogies 
between problem statement and 
existing knowledge support 
refinement of the question. 
• Iterative working method is 
possible and effective to refine 
the problem and to explore the 
nature of the question. 
• Basic concepts should be well 
defined.
Afterwards, it was surprising to see 
analogy between dialog and data 
farming process in Sandis simulation, 
see Bruun et al. 2010. In Fig. 1., both 
processes are presented, bold text 
corresponds to focus group working 
method. 
Analogies can be given in terms of 
methods like the one in Fig. 1 or in 
terms of models. Effective use of 
analogies benefits the modeling work 
towards its objectives. Here, the 
modeling framework is the data 
farming and the subject under study 
is strategic operational analysis. The 
goal is to understand how given 
problems can be reformulated in 
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Figure 1. Bold text corresponds to the focus group working method and normal text to 
simulation procedure presented in Bruun et al, 2010. Blue arrow from the middle oval to left 
hand side upper corner corresponds to movement from the refined question to data farming 
procedure.
terms of data farming. 
Basic concepts dealing with the 
question need to be clearly refined. 
Otherwise, the risk of having 
incomplete requirements for the 
model increases. However, in the 
modeling simplifications and other 
restrictive assumptions are often 
necessary in order to construct a 
solvable model. 
We move on now to focus group 
subjects and documentation of dialog 
in IDFW 23 from the briefing abstract 
to observations for supporting the 
modeling. Any particular  program or 
software not considered in IDFW 23.
Pre-Briefing of the Group
The introductory briefing for the 
group was given by the author in the 
following abstract in IDFW 23 web 
pages, see Ref 3. 
“The objective of the team is to 
discuss on methods and models for 
strategic operational analysis in the 
context of data  farming. Strategic 
studies often include a lot of 
knowledge given in non-numerical  form, which yields to 
challenges to use it in computer simulations. However, 
certain identifications and mappings can be done by ordering 
or clustering existing knowledge. Topics for discussion are 
planned but not restricted to commensurability of different 
measures, prioritization, comparison methods, grouping 
methods and mappings. During the discussion, some 
decision making problems could be analyzed by identifying 
the possible input information and mapping it in the suitable 
parameter form for data farming. Analysis models will be 
discussed and existing models are warmly welcome for data 
farming study. The group will also focus on the models that 
can be implemented rather easily for strategic studies with 
data farming.
During the week, the group will document discussion, 
models, problems and possible simulations and solutions to a 
given paper form. 
The aim of this work is to bring together specialists of 
data farming and strategic researchers to observe possibilities 
for co-operation, identify problems suitable for data farming 
studies and identify possible applications for further studies.” 
Strategic Operational Analysis
Strategic operational analysis appeared to have different 
meanings for different people. In order to have something 
for data farming, the group concentrated on refining the 
definition of the strategic level operational analysis 
(SLMOA) related to modeling terminology. This leads to 
rethinking of the question in level  of modeling and practice. 
The aim was to consider strategic level operational analysis 
in military studies connected to modeling concepts in data 
farming. These concepts and connections are visualized 
figure 2. 
The group continued with discussion on the limitations 
and objectives needed to construct a frame for models. For a 
definition of the question, the discussion ended up with three 
part definition to cover questions: what, how and to whom? 
The proposition constructed for the definition reads as:
• What: Strategic level military operational analysis 
(SLMOA) is a multidimensional abstact object which 
provide refined information in prosessed understandable 
form. 
• To whom: SLMOA supports decision makers acting on 
high level in hierarchy.
• How: SLMOA is based on best known scientifically 
proved facts and best known practices i.e. It is not exact.
These principles will not provide enough for data 
farming modeling. They are aimed at support model 
construction and application of data farming. 
Towards Models for SLMOA
Data farming is based on the study of parameterized models, 
which are related to the original question, transparent and 
well documented. The modeling process should be repetable 
and results should follow from the modeling work.  
Discussion considered the model development process to 
transfor the given question to data farmable models. First, 
modeling needs a dialog between subject matter experts and 
modelers. In order to speed up this dialog, questionaires in 
problem refinement can be used. These might be in a 
collection of possible questions with alternative choices from 
modeler to problem statement and vice versa  focusing the 
given question to modellable form. This iterative 
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 Figure 2. Levels of operational analysis study with differences of model structures and 
information exchange. 
development  process is illustrated with a four steps pre-
modeling cycle in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Description of iterative process in problem refinement 
from the identified modeling needs to refined problem statement. 
Dashed line in the upper left cycle is an optional iteration which 
would be repeated as long as the question is refined into a form 
suitable for modeling.
Refined questions can be further studied with related 
scenarios, if these exist. If there aren’t suitable scenarios 
available, pure model development can be used to gain 
understandig for  the problem statement and the scenario 
development.
Figure 4. Modeling divided in terms of predictive and different 
time scale reactive analysis. Time scale refers to modeler time 
available from the question to the answer.  
Model development needs preliminary knowledge on 
time limits i.e. time available for translating questions into 
models and answers from models to decision maker. Given 
time resources affects modeling possibilities, accuracy of the 
models and the results. A modeling time scale was identified 
to be predictive or reactive. For reactive analysis time scales 
were furthed divided into short time range (less than a day), 
medium time range (less than a month) and long time range. 
Predictive analysis means instant modeling in few minutes 
time scale, which leads to need of a bank of beforehand 
studied scenarios.  Time scale related to above discussed 
modeling terminology is illustrated in Figure 4.
Modeler Point of View
Modeling experience is a key in providing data farming for 
SLMOA. The modeler needs to foresee what kind of 
questions may become under interest and to develope 
models, routines, algorithms and test scenarios with possible 
question framework. In principle, the modeler needs ”two 
hats”: one for asking questions and another for answer them. 
By doing this dialog, modeler could recognize possible 
relevant parameters and principles for the model 
construction.
As depicted in Fig. 4., modeling response time of the 
questions limits possibilities to use the models and  methods.  
When the problem is focused into modellable form, data 
farming can be applied if the models are suitable for it. After a 
parametrized model for given question is introduced, data 
farming can be used to gain better understanding of the 
problem or to ask new questions. This methodological aspect 
is subject independent and holds for SLMOA as well as any 
other subject and is illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Four fields related to data farming in SLMOA.  
To conclude the modelling part of the paper, the author 
would like to state that data farming can be used to support 
SLMOA if we have parametriced model(s). In particular, the 
following considerations in  SLMOA may be interesting for 
more concrete further studies.
• Consideration of the problem with incomplete input 
information i.e. data farming, can be used to examine the 
relevance and affects of the missing part of the 
information needed in models. 
• Translation of nonnumeric information to models by 
comparison, priorization, when data farming might be 
suitable to consider the sensitivity and accuracy of these 
translations in the modeling sense.   
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• Ability to do predictive analysis in SLMOA could be 
increased by data farming generic models and scenarios.
Conclusions
This paper describes the work carried out in the focus group 
in IDFW 23. The aim was to discuss on  possible applications 
of data farming in support of strategic operational analysis. 
The work concentrated on the process of trasnlation of given 
questions to data farmable models. During the week, 
SLMOA was considered from the modeling point of view 
without going into detailed modeling study. Progress in the 
group was in the methodological understanding and process 
description on how to proceed from wide question statement 
to modeling study. The discussion of SLMOA led to a 
threefold proposition for the definition of SLMOA 
containing what SLMOA is, whom SLMOA is targeted to 
and how SLMOA is considered. 
By comparing the work carried out in the focus group 
and the pre-briefing abstract, one sees that all targets 
mentioned were not achieved. Consideration of the concrete 
models and solving methods would have needed a pre-
briefed question for problem refinition, modeling and data 
farming. However, observations made during the week 
clarified methodology for  SLMOA and encourage to consider 
data farming further with more focused questions, models 
and solving methods in SLMOA. 
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International Data Farming Workshop 24
When: March 2012
Where: 	
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
Data farming is a capability that makes use of high performance computing to run models many times. This 
capability gives modelers and analysts an enhanced ability to discover trends and outliers in results, do 
sensitivity studies, verify and validate over extended ranges of input parameters, and consider modeling and 
analyzing non-linear phenomena with characteristics that cannot be precisely defined. The International Data 
Farming Workshops have been a forum for the exploration of important questions for many years. The cores 
of the workshops are teams that are formed around these questions. These multi-disciplinary teams use data 
farming practices including simulations, such as agent based models, rapid model prototyping, high performance 
computing, and data analysis, state-of-the-art design of experiments, parameter space exploration, and 
collaborative environments. The first workshop took place in Maui in 1999 and the workshop coming up in 
Monterey next month is number 24.  We now have teams lined up for IDFW 24 and whether you are a 
newcomer to the workshops or have participated in the past, we welcome you to participate! 
IDFW 24 Tentative Agenda
Sunday: Optional technical sessions; Opening reception and dinner
Monday: Opening briefs and team poster sessions in the morning, then begin work in teams
Tuesday - Thursday: Work in teams
Friday: Outbriefs and Closing Ceremony in the afternoon
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